The case of Korematsu v. United States centered upon an average welder from California becoming a figurehead in the civil rights movement. Korematsu, as an individual, was an unlikely civil rights activist, because he was not politically motivated in his everyday life. In fact, he was not even registered to vote. This raises the question why Korematsu decided to launch a case against the United States (US) Government.
The answer can be found in the turmoil that Korematsu faced due to the orders that were placed upon Japanese Americans (Justice Owen J Roberts, Dissenting from the Majority). The actions that Korematsu took, which lead up to his arrest, were inextricably linked to the actions of the US government restricting his free movement. As Justice Owen J Roberts provided:
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"Challenging Wartime Internment: Supreme Court Records from Korematsu v. United States:".
The predicament in which the petitioner thus found himself was this: he was forbidden, by Military Order, to leave the zone in which he lived; he was forbidden, by Military Order, after a date fixed, to be found within that zone unless he were in an Assembly Center located in that zone.
The judgment of Dissenting Judges illustrate the hardship that the government created, which included the drastic step of Korematsu trying to change himself (i.e. undergoing plastic surgery).
It seemed that a personal bias of a single man (De Witt) against all Japanese resulted in Americans being interned, just because of their heritage. The Submission of the American Citizens League (ACL) on the Behalf of Korematsu (ACL Brief) provides evidence of this bias. For example, the ACL provided comments of General De Witt before the House Naval Affairs Committee on April 13, 1943. The comments made by De Witt against the Japanese would constitute racism (and hate speech) in the 21st Century, which can be seen in their content:
A Jap’s a Jap. I don’t want any of them. We got them out. They are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen. Theoretically, he is still a Japanese and you can’t change him.
This language illustrates that there is a sound argument that the actions of the US Government were unconstitutional, because they failed to provide a rationalized basis for the argument that all Japanese were a threat to the safety of the US (ACL Brief).
In fact, the majority decision in the Supreme Court recognized that the demonization of a single race was “suspect” (Opinion of the Supreme Court, December 18, 1944). The court recognized that there might be potential problems with the internment of a whole group. Nevertheless, in an aim to prevent espionage such an act may be necessary initially, which then could give time for loyal members to be identified (Opinion of the Supreme Court, December 18, 1944 citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)). Thus, the mere fact that Korematsu broke the order was sufficient to uphold his conviction.
The majority opinion highlighted their misgivings about the submissions of De Witt; however, the legitimacy of the actions in general was necessary in a state of emergency. Nevertheless, the argument presented by the dissenting judges was that the US Government’s actions had more or less forced the actions of Korematsu (Justice Owen J Roberts; Justice Frank Murphy; Justice Robert Jackson). The judgment of Justice Frank Murphy condemned the decisions of military authorities to condemning a whole race to indeterminate detention. As Justice Robert Jackson highlights the internment could last only as long as the war, because they are unconstitutional. This should be enough to limit the action. In fact, fact Jackson’s dissenting judgment highlights the majority’s application of Hirabayashi v. United States is misplaced. This is because Hirabayashi simply referred to a curfew of Japanese Americans whereas the internment camps were total deprivation of liberty. Thus, such a justification should not be used to support such harsh measures, which could not be a proportionate derogation of constitutional rights.
The argument of Jackson has two implications. The first is that such a deprivation and oppression could force the average non-political American, such as Korematsu, to challenge his/her government. The second implication of Jackson’s judgment is that there must be a balancing act when considering security and constitutional rights. This is more appropriate when dealing with a severe restriction of human rights, such as a deprivation of liberty). In fact, in 21st Century America, the Jackson approach is the prevalent approach. Therefore, the decision of the majority in Korematsu is particularly weak, especially when considered in the light of the poor decisions and bias that was present in the military authorities (most notably seen in the actions and words of De Witt). Consequenly, these actions pushed the average loyal American to become a figurehead of the civil rights movement during the Second World War.
Evidence Used:
Justice Frank Murphy, Dissenting from the Majority
Justice Owen J Roberts, Dissenting from the Majority
Justice Robert Jackson, Dissenting from the Majority
Opinion of the Supreme Court, December 18, 1944 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943))
Submission of the American Citizens League (ACL) on the Behalf of Korematsu (ACL Brief) (referring to Submissions of General De Witt before the House Naval Affairs Committee on April 13, 1943)
