Marder”s book is about the British Royal Navy”s contributions to the action in World War II, including its interactions with the navy from Japan during a contentious time during the war. The primary thesis of this work is that certain personalities, including Sir James Somerville, were critical in forming the Royal Navy, even over the objections of the likes of Winston Churchill, who did not see a Pacific fleet as being necessary until very late in the war. Somerville and his ilk won that particular political battle, training what would look like a rag-tag group of sailors, turning them into a naval fighting force capable of combating the Japanese during this time, and serving as an important component in the British military during a time when the stakes were their highest.
The authors support this thesis with tremendous documentation from both the British and Japanese side. They draw extremely heavily on the personal accounts of individuals who were involved in both the formation of the Pacific fleet and those who participated in important battles, including the Battle of Java Sea. In doing so, the author is able to learn from varied perspectives just how much resistance there was to the existence of this particular fleet, just how little confidence there was in the ability of this fleet to do its job, and just how important they ended up being to the war effort itself. He interviewed individuals who noted that during one particular difficult time in the war, the Allied forces had nearly collapsed in the Dutch Indies. Those sources noted that while the Allies were having some success in the European theater, there was a very real chance of defeat in Asia, and that without a fully prepared Pacific fleet at that time, it might not have been possible for the Allies to come out ahead.
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"Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions.".
These arguments from the authors are perhaps somewhat overstated, but they are convincing in a sense. Because they relied so heavily on individual recollections, and because individuals often have self-interested motives for recalling war in a certain way, one cannot be entirely sure that the accounts of these individuals are exactly accurate. However, they need not be completely accurate in order for the authors” arguments to work. The authors draw a very clear line between the Allied failures in the Dutch Indies and the need for a fighting force to support the Allied effort during that time. Likewise, the colorful recollections of the interactions between Churchill and his leaders provide backing for the idea that even the formation of this group of sea fighters was an uphill battle from the beginning. Understanding the context of the situation, it is certainly easy to buy the idea that Churchill, who did not want to strain his resources and seemed to believe that victory was inevitable, would oppose additional expansion of his Pacific fleet.
Overall, this research is well-substantiated. The book is balanced because the authors were able to collect hordes of source data from both sides of the conflict. By bringing into bear the Japanese perspective, the authors were able to ensure the legitimacy of their claims, and this adds some credence to the arguments made. The writing itself is simple, which was an important stylistic choice for this work. It seems as if the authors were interested in allowing the story itself, and the significant documentation, to speak on behalf of this work. With that in mind, it is something of a must-read for any person who wants to have a fuller understanding of how political interactions helped to shape the war, and for those who are interested in the dynamics that guided the battle, especially in the Asian theater.
