Locke defines three types of liberty of man. The first is a natural liberty, which entails that the human being is unbound to the authority of another human being: natural liberty is only constrained by natural phenomena, such as death. The second form of liberty is a social liberty, whereby the human being as part of a social order has autonomy to determine its authorities: this is most similar to conceptions of democracy, whereby all humans have the liberty to choose the laws they live by, whereas all humans are equal under this same law. The third type of liberty addresses the “blank-spot” in the law: in areas where the established law does not reach, the human being can pursue his or her own course of action.
These accounts of different forms of liberty reflect the difference Locke draws amidst two types of law. The account of law that Locke supports is consistent with his views of liberty: laws are agreed upon by members of society and carried out by the established legislative branch of the social order; there are no exceptions to this type of law, in so far as it is agreed upon and applies to all. The second type of law in essence is a certain absence of law: it is the point outside of the dimension where the legislative powers who execute the law in accordance with the agreed rule no longer functions. Law in this sense is what Locke terms a law of nature, one that exists independently of socially prescribed laws.
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"Locke’s Second Treatise of Government".
Locke’s opposition to Filmer’s view in this same paragraph accordingly can be interpreted as follows: the freedom that Filmer proposes is one that is similar to what Locke terms the natural liberty of man. However, historically human beings have entered into social contracts and communities, because the natural liberty of man is subject to volatility: namely, the natural liberty of man cannot be guaranteed since it can always be threatened by the will of another. Filmer’s view is untenable because it takes a naïve view of natural liberty, considering it as a utopia, when the real historical reasons humans have entered into social contracts is because the threat to natural liberty that is paradoxically also inherent to natural liberty.
