In Part IV of Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, the author begins by rigorously identifying his starting point: he will trust neither his senses, nor his previous logical proofs, nor his own thoughts regardless of his mental state. He immediately recognizes, however, that the fact that he is thinking implies that he exists. Descartes does not make any assumptions about his form; his ability to think does not mean he must have a body. However, he concludes that any conception he can think of clearly and vividly must be true. This conclusion leads abruptly to the assertion that if he can clearly conceive of things more perfect than himself, God must exist, because only God could inspire him to think of things more perfect than he himself!
This was a surprise! I had expected Descartes to continue thinking about his own characteristics; instead, he made a leap from “I must exist” to “God must exist.” I immediately questioned whether the leap was justified. Descartes states that he is not perfect, but highly imperfect, and thus could not possibly think of perfection without a higher inspiration such as God. This logic makes sense, and he goes on to say that those elements of himself which are imperfect (i.e., those he would change if it were possible) cannot be part of God. Recognition of the imperfect implies knowledge of the perfect, which is found only in God, so the existence of God is again required.
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"“I think, therefore I am:” Descartes’ Discourse on the Method".
Descartes next considers the qualities of God; for instance, does God’s existence imply that he has a body? He argues that if a being has two natures, physical and non-physical, which are dependent on one another, that being must be imperfect due to the dependence. Therefore God cannot have a body, or he would be imperfect. This argument did not convince me at all. When Descartes states “if a thing is composed ·of simpler elements· in any way, that shows that it is dependent on something else, and dependence is obviously a defect,” his logic leaves gaping holes, in my opinion. At this point I read back to the earlier passage, in which Descartes reasons that he can think without having a body. I recognized that I was convinced by that argument, but that the fact that a body is not necessary does not imply it doesn’t exist. If the body does exist, it is not required, so how can the non-physical being (the soul) be dependent on the physical being (the body)? Thus, the statement that dependence is imperfect and therefore God cannot have a body is not reasonable, in my view.
