Kant’s view on the will as being the subject and author of the law refers to how the human will, while bound to moral codes and human laws in a metaphorical sense, is not physically bound to them; humans can ultimately choose to behave in whatever ways they want, though morality and government usually restrict their behavior. In his conception, this is autonomy: every human being possesses free will that they are capable of using in whatever way they see fit. Indeed, “free will” is the ideal term to describe what Kant is arguing. Kant’s view is that human beings do not have a physical tether that keeps them from acting in immoral ways, and thus the only ways to control them are through natural law or supernatural constructs such as religion. However, free will means that human beings need to choose to follow these codes and constructs, and they are under no obligation to do so.
Autonomy is distinguished from the “heteronomy of the will” because autonomy describes urges and desires that spring from the will itself, while heteronomy refers to external influences on the will. In most cases, these two forces act in a push-pull manner, with the desires of the will moderated and influenced by heteronomy, and heteronomy’s effects being dictated by the individual autonomy of human beings. Another crucial distinction is that while human beings possess the autonomy to disobey natural law, heteronomy acts as a counteracting force to bring humans back into accordance with natural law. This can be done through physical, mental, or spiritual consequences for disobedience; for example, a lawbreaker could be sent to prison for committing a crime. In this, heteronomy and autonomy work in concert to aid and reinforce one another with the intent of creating an equilibrium between humans and their environment.
Use your promo and get a custom paper on
"Kant on Free Will".
- Garver, Eugene. “Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Morals.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27.1 (1989): 7-28.
- Kant, Immanuel. Kant: The metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
