Nuclear terrorism is an act of terrorism in which a person or a terrorist organization detonates a nuclear weapon with the intention of causing death and serious bodily harm or significant damage to property. Nuclear terrorism takes several forms including intentionally sabotaging a nuclear facility and detonating a nuclear device. The threat of terrorist organizations acquiring and using nuclear weapons is an issue of concern in the United States. Although there have been instances of theft of small quantities of fissile material, which are usually of low concern and below category 3 special nuclear material, there is no evidence to suggest that terrorist organizations have succeeded in acquiring category 1 special nuclear material, which is the critical mass amount of weapons-grade plutonium that is required to constitute a nuclear weapon.
According to the Illicit Trafficking Database update by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released in 2005, there were 121 incidents reported in 2004 involving illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities with nuclear and radioactive material. Since 2003, there has been one incident involving weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in which an individual was apprehended in Sidahlo, Georgia attempting to transport one hundred and seventy grams of highly enriched uranium across the Georgian-Armenian border. The report indicates that there was a significant increase in incidences reported between 2003 and 2004 compared to previous periods. This increase is attributed to increased surveillance and reporting suggesting that the actual smuggling did not increase over the period. This increase was blamed on poor disposal of radioactive material as opposed to increased criminal activity.
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Data from the report also indicates that for the period between 1993 and 2004, there were 18 incidents of trafficking of weapons grade material. Most of these incidents involved very small amounts of nuclear material with only a few involving kilogram amounts. Over the period, more than twenty-four incidents involved trace quantities of plutonium out of a total of 220 incidents involving nuclear materials. The other incidents involved low-grade nuclear material, commonly reactor fuel pellets, thorium, depleted uranium and natural uranium (Mayer et al.). These sources contained low quantities of nuclear material that were too small to have significant use in building nuclear devices. These incidences according to the report indicate the possibility of high demand for nuclear material on the black market with unknown amounts reaching their destination market.
There are currently two terror groups that are well financed to the point of being capable of pursuing nuclear weapons. These are al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo. If these groups were to build a nuclear weapon, it would probably be a dirty uranium bomb. However, they would encounter several challenges on their quest. The essential components required to build a nuclear bomb do not exist in significant amounts in nature and are very challenging to produce. All nuclear weapons are dependent on nuclear fission to work. This is the process in which a heavy atom nucleus splits into lighter nuclei and neutrons with the release of high amounts of energy. If enough nuclear materials are present and at appropriate configurations, the initial fission causes a chain reaction to occur. The smallest amount of material needed to sustain the chain reaction must be known and exceeded in order to result in a runaway reaction that is required for a nuclear explosion to occur. U-235 is actually the only explosive nuclide that is found naturally in significant amounts. When uranium is mined, 0.7% of it is composed of u-235 with more than 99% being U-238 that cannot sustain the explosion reaction. Enrichment must, therefore, be carried out to increase the concentration of U-235 (Bunn, and Wier). Enrichment is a technically advanced process whose details remain a tightly guarded secret. Weapon-grade uranium contains more than ninety percent U-235 while HEU contains at least 20%.
It is not economically feasible for a terrorist organization to build a nuclear weapon. The process of uranium mining is very expensive due to the minute amounts that are available in nature. In addition, specialized equipment is required to protect the miners from lethal doses of radiation. Once the mining is achieved, enrichment is required to increase the concentration of U-235 to 20% to achieve highly enriched uranium or 80% and above to achieve weapons-grade uranium. The technique of efficiently enriching uranium is a highly guarded secret that is unavailable to most of these organizations. It is, therefore, more reasonable for terrorist organizations to purchase a black-market weapon instead. This will reduce the cost of mining and enrichment and ensure that the bomb is usable.
The Black sea region is considered to be an important crossroad serving as an intersection of northern, eastern, southern and western corridors for the flow of goods, people and ideas between Europe, Asia, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East. It is also regarded as the heart of the nuclear black market in the world. The most likely potential sources of nuclear material are Pakistan, Russia, and countries with nuclear reactors that are fueled by highly enriched uranium. Russia holds the largest cache of nuclear weapons in the world, estimated at 11,000 warheads, former Soviet Union member countries hold a third of the world’s HEU fueled reactors and Pakistan holds between 90 and 100 warheads and is increasing its plutonium-producing capacity.
This essay addresses the issue of terrorist organizations and nuclear terrorism. An important consideration would be the threat from rogue states. Examples of rogue states include Iran and North Korea. These are countries with nuclear programs and display aggressive nuclear behavior towards other countries considered as their enemies (Geis, and Wunderlich). These countries also have the potential of forming alliances with terrorist groups with the likelihood of allowing them access to their nuclear stockpiles.
- Bunn, Matthew, and Anthony Wier. “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?”. The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science, vol 607, no. 1, 2006, pp. 133-149. SAGE Publications, doi:10.1177/0002716206290260.
- Geis, Anna, and Carmen Wunderlich. “The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly: Comparing The Notions Of ‘Rogue’ And ‘Evil’ In International Politics”. International Politics, vol 51, no. 4, 2014, pp. 458-474. Springer Nature, doi:10.1057/ip.2014.19. Accessed 19 Nov 2018.
- Mayer, Klaus et al. “Nuclear Forensics—A Methodology Providing Clues On The Origin Of Illicitly Trafficked Nuclear Materials”. The Analyst, vol 130, no. 4, 2005, pp. 433-441. Royal Society Of Chemistry (RSC), doi:10.1039/b412922a. Accessed 19 Nov 2018.
