Effects of partisan elections on Texas’ judicial branch versus an appointed judiciary
The judicial branch in Texas composes of the court system and legal agencies. Since Texas becoming a state in 1845, judges have been appointed by the governor with the consent from the Senate. In 1876 all that changed and since then all judges at all levels have been elected through partisan elections (Cheek, Kyle and Anthony, 19). There have been several consequences since then, and they include the following discussed below.
When it comes to the judicial branch, the choice is always between accountability and independence. The partisan elections offer the option of responsibility while the appointment provides the opportunity for freedom. Independent in that no party influences their decisions, while being accountable such that they exercise their powers without undermining political and judicial systems they swear to uphold.
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Partisan elections increase accountability as only candidates who possess the characteristic is most likely to be voted in. On the other hand appointed judiciary, is more likely to minimize political considerations, ensures judicial independence, advances the worth of bench and motivates adoption of other innovations to make courts more effective.
Partisan elections uphold democracy (Kraemer, Richard and David, 197). It gives the voters a chance in the selection or retention of the judicial branch. Therefore the process involved in the partisan elections is usually transparent. On the positive side, it strengthens the idea of control of judges. Unlike in the appointment judiciary, the judges elected are a result of a voice of the majority of its people. This opportunity increases the confidence that the citizens have in their judicial system.
The partisan elections have also been negative in the sense that it weakens the effect that the legislature and the governor have over the judiciary. It is diminishing the power that the government has on the court in the state. This is so as the governor may not agree with the people’s decision, but it is not in his power to change that as the judges are accountable to the people. (Cheek, Kyle and Anthony, 19)
In the appointed judiciary, the branch is more likely to select a system that is highly qualified unlike in the partisan elections where voters are involved, and they may not be competent to vote on judicial aspirants. The voters may even have less knowledge of the qualifications and the philosophy of the judiciary
In the appointed court, it is an advantage not to be directly accountable to the people as they cannot be voted out of office if they make a decision contrary to the expectations of the people. For the partisan election, a judge may make a decision that pleases voters to retain his/her position in the judiciary.
Partisan elections add campaign contributions and funds openly to the process of judicial selection. These elections are way costly, and this money comes from the state and special interest groups. In this way, a judicial aspirant will campaign with points that are not necessarily essential to their constituents but to the interest group that is backing their campaign unlike in the appointed judiciary where there is no campaign and thus less costly. The voting in partisan elections tends to be biased as the people may vote in a judicial officer because of their political views. They are therefore politicizing the office.
Through the campaigning process in the partisan elections, the aspirants are given a chance to address issues and even sell out their policies. This is important as it helps people to interact with them. From the interaction, the people can filter out and choose the best for the judicial branch.
- Cheek, Kyle, and Anthony Champagne. Judicial Politics in Texas: Partisanship, Money, and Politics in State Courts. New York: P. Lang, 2005. Print.
- Kraemer, Richard H, Charldean Newell, and David F. Prindle. Essentials of Texas Politics. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. Print.
