The so-called ‘uses’ of knowledge is one of the most controversial topics in conversations which surround the Theory of Knowledge. Some argue that there is such a thing as knowledge for the sake of knowledge and that such knowledge can and should be pursued for its own sake and for the sake of increasing the knowledge of humanity as a whole. However, others argue that it is impossible to separate systems of knowledge from the societies which give birth them and that, as a result, of this, it does not make any sense to state that there is such a thing as a form of knowledge which is not fundamentally concerned with changing the world in some way, or with asserting and maintaining a certain view of it. This essay will explore this dichotomy by considering two kinds of purportedly ‘neutral’ knowledge; scientific theory and economic science and showing how they are imbedded in their social conditions. It will investigate these specifically by considering the link between social theory and scientific research. When this is done, it is possible to see how forms of knowledge are mediated by their social conditions even when they claim to be objective.
It is often assumed that scientific knowledge is neutral and that it is able to reflect objective reality in a way which is not necessarily involved in changing the world or in supporting systems which would seek to control. It is generally believed that it is possible to ascertain the objective truth of a situation through scientific methods. However, since Ancient times, it has been possible to draw a direct parallel between the nature of scientific knowledge and the ruling classes and ideologies which espoused this knowledge. Indeed, all scientific knowledge can be shown to be mediated by the its social conditions. I will investigate this first of all by considering physics as it attempts to explain the universe.
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"Some Areas Of Knowledge Seek To Describe The World, Whereas Others Seek To Transform It".
Historical trends in relation to physics are explored in depth in the book ‘The Copernican Turn’ by Thomas Kuhn. Here the author argues that ‘Man does not exist for long without inventing a cosmology, because such a cosmology can provide him with a world-view which permeates and gives meaning to his every action, practical and spiritual.’ (Kuhn, 1957. 6.) It is always the case the a dominant civilisation will determine a cosmological world view. The creation of such a view allows such a civilisation to understand their actions, whether or not they are historically necessary within a universal context and therefore to allow them to justify actions. Kuhn notes that such behaviours can be witnessed in one studies societies such as Ancient Egypt. Kuhn observes that ‘though primitive conceptions of the universe display considerable substantive variation, all are shaped by primarily by terrestrial events, the events that impinge most immediately upon the designers of the systems.’ (Kuhn, 1957. 6) For example; ‘in one principle form of Egyptian cosmology the earth was pictured as an elongated platter. The platter’s long dimension paralleled the Nile; its flat bottom was the alluvial basin to which ancient Egypt was restricted.’ (Kuhn, 1957. 10)
It is demonstrably the case that ancient scientific knowledge, even when it claimed, and believed itself, to be entirely objective, could be seen to reflect exactly the dominant social conditions and relations of its time period. It is often claimed that our age has reached a state in which it is no longer the case that objective knowledge is so obviously mediated by subjective circumstances. However, arguments still exists which suggest that this is the case.
An example of this can be seen in current debates surrounding evolution and natural selection and wider understandings of biology. Again, it is possible to show that this theory is mediated by its social conditions. Usually, evolutionary biology is taken to be the highpoint of the current scientific explanation for the objective truth of the development of life on earth. For example, scientist Richard Dawkins writes; ‘the laws of evolution are quite simply the only possible way of explaining the objective truth of the situation of the development of animal, plant and human life as we know and see it upon earth.’ (Dawkins, 2007. 70)
While existing science may point to this being true, it is also that case that such a statement can be argued to reflect existing social relations much more than it appears. When commenting on
Darwinian theories of evolution, Karl Marx noticed that the laws, while they may be scientifically true, nonetheless exactly mirror the state of isolated individualism and free competition which dominates capitalist market relations. Marx writes that; ‘When Darwin looked at the natural world, he discovered and documented the process of capitalist exchange.’ (Marx, 2000. 70) As such, while many argue that biological knowledge has now reached a point whereby it is possible to claim that it embodies complete objectivity and separation from the social world, it is nonetheless still possible to argue that it contains elements which show it to be partially reducible to the social relations from whence it comes.
A second form of knowledge which this paper will consider is economic knowledge, deriving from mathematical calculations. While it is often argued that economic knowledge simply describes the objective nature of the world and makes not attempt to change it, it can be shown that this process of reflection is already embedded within social constructs and therefore within methods of controlling and determining the course of the world. In his book, ‘Capitalism and Freedom,’ the seminal free-market economist Milton Friedman claims to have discovered transcendental laws which regulate the economy and which can be used to ensure that the social values and general quality of life progresses continuously. This is most famously evident in his work ‘Capitalism and Freedom’ in which he claims to have understood the fact that freedom is a naturally crucial part of society and that, as long as a free market is respected, one can expect to see social progress. He writes; ‘it [the market] gives people what they want, instead of what a particular group thinks that they ought to want. Underlying most arguments against the free market is the lack of belief in freedom itself.’ (Freedman, 2002. 20) In the 1960s, Friedman argued that unregulated free markets were sure to give people what they needed and would lead to global prosperity.
However, many people argue, that, given the current global recession and the severe economic problems which the world is currently enduring, it is no longer possible to make such a statement. Not only has Friedman’s logic been proved wrong, but it may also be argued that it is possible to describe it as actively supporting a certain view of the world and a certain set of social relations. When writing about conventional economics, Marx makes it clear that, before commencing economic ‘research,’ traditional economics takes a certain set of social relations entirely for granted. Marx writes that; ‘ Political economy is only capable of proceeding along the foundations which its sets for itself if it assumes such things as exchange, capital and the commodity to be historically given. However these are precisely the most mediated and historically determined of any social object.’ (Marx, 2007. 50) Therefore, it can be argued that although economic knowledge pertains to objective truth, this truth is often disproved by historical events. Not only this, but it can also be argued that, given the nature of such knowledge, it is possible to argue that its very ‘objectivity’ serves to support a system and set of relations which are, in themselves, the result of series of contingent historical processes and not, as those who claims the sovereignty of scientific knowledge would insist, something objective true in and of themselves. Therefore, it is not possible to accord ‘objective’ reality to economic knowledge.
In conclusion, this paper has investigated the so-called objective nature of knowledge alongside the possibility for knowledge to be used to change the world or to support existing institutions. By considering two primary forms of contemporary knowledge, science and economics, it has argued that, while a degree of truth may be accorded to them, it equally possible to state that their conclusions are necessarily connected to the social relations from which they emerge. By demonstrating this, it is possible to claim that each form of knowledge may be shown to carry traces of the social relations out of which it comes and that, therefore, the choice between an objective knowledge and one which seeks to change or affect the world is a false and unproductive one.
