The argument that a necessarily perfect dog must exist works in three steps each of which can be understood to possess particular presuppositions. To begin with, the argument presupposes “perfection” as something that may be divided into a variety of conceivable predicates and that each of these predicate may be then be assigned to a being that is deemed to be entirely perfect. Importantly, these perfections require the “idea” of a perfect dog. Fido, in this argument, is a perfect instantiation of a the idea of a dog, and it is only against this idea that his perfection can be measured. Fido is not perfect in every singe way, rather he is simply perfect in terms of his “dogness.”
If one understands that existence is a predicate of a being, then it must necessarily be the case that a being that possesses all possible perfections must necessarily exist. If a perfect dog did not exist then it would be less than perfect; leading to a contradiction within the first of the argument. From this perspective, it seems that argument is sound, and rationally correct. However, there are two immediate responses which can be given to it. The first of these it is an essentially idealist argument. Without the conception of the actually existing universal dog, of which Fido is the most perfect instantiation then the argument, and the very idea of perfection that it employs If one denies the active existence of such universals and adopts a nominalist stand point, then the argument ceases to hold any weight. Not only does the idea of perfection disappear, but so does the conception that such perfection can be understood as an accumulation of particular predicates; amongst which may be included existence.
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"The Ontological Argument".
It is clear that this argument has clear relevance for more conventional ontological arguments. According to Joel Friedman (1979), for an argument to qualify as an ontological argument then it “must start with some definition of God, as a premise, and together with additional a priori premises, finish with the existence of God, as a conclusion” (p. 73). That is, an ontological argument seeks to prove to the existence of God from its definition, and without any reference to material being. By starting from the definition of God as a being that is absolutely perfect; that is that possesses all possible predicates to the highest level of intensity and efficacy, the argument then seeks to prove that a contradiction ensues if this being does not exist, and it can therefore be argued to provide a variation on the ontological argument concerning Fido. It takes the supreme idea of a supreme being, and, by defining such a being as perfect, seeks to prove that it must exist in reality.
Crucial to Kant’s criticism of this argument is the suggestion that it represents an essentially analytic truth; i.e. its conclusion is contained within its definition and, therefore, it does not concern the actual positive existence of God, but rather the logical structure of the idea of him. Kant writes, therefore, that “that the conditioned necessity of judgements…is not an absolute necessity of things” (1998, p. 564). Necessity understood as emerging from an analytic truth can only be understood to form a precondition for the possible existence of something, it cannot prove its actual existence. That is to say that, according to Kant, the ontological argument can be understood to be stating that “if God exists, he must necessarily exist” but that this is essentially a tautology and cannot provide an understanding of God outside of our own idea of him. As such, Kant’s essential point about the ontological argument itself is that it highlights a particular truth about a mode of thinking, but that this cannot be translated into an argument for the positive existence of God.
