The Vietnam conflict lasted between 1945 when the country started its struggle for independence from France and April 1975 when South Vietnam officially fell under communism. The war did not involve a matter of America’s national security. The country had nothing to gain from the war, either economically or territorially. The decision to participate was based on the Truman Doctrine of 1947 that made it America’s policy to assist countries against communism. Other reasons that made the country take part in the conflict and the eventual war included the Domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and South Vietnam’s weaknesses and disability to resist communist infiltration. Each of them is discussed in the following part of this essay.
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 made assisting other countries to fight against communism a policy of the US. President Eisenhower took office in 1953 and shared in his predecessor’s policy towards communism and Vietnam (Slaton, 1995). He felt that the regime in North Vietnam represented international communism and that it had to be stopped from infiltrating South Vietnam. South Vietnam was still under French rule but had made numerous efforts at gaining her independence, and France was almost giving in. The US felt that South Vietnam would fall straight under the regime in the North and decided to get involved to stop this from happening. In January 1954, it sent two hundred technicians and airplane mechanics, and twenty-two B-26 medium bombers to assist the French in South Vietnam (Slaton, 1995). When South Vietnam gained her independence, the US supported the new government by providing it with over $1 billion in economic and military assistance.
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The Domino theory had a significant influence on the foreign policies of the US in the early 1950s. According to the theory, a Communist victory in one country would lead to a chain of communist takeovers in the neighboring countries (Daum, Gardner & Mausbach, 2003). The US used the theory to justify its presence in Vietnam and its increased involvement in the war. It felt that the whole of Southeast Asia would fall to Communism and that the Middle East would follow suit. America feared that more communist regimes in Southeast Asia would threaten its position in the Pacific Islands as well as its fundamental security interests in the Far East (Daum, Gardner & Mausbach, 2003). Additionally, the country feared that losing the region to communism would have severe economic consequences for many nations around the world. For example, Britain’s post-war recovery relied on the revival of the rubber and tin industries in its Malaya colony, and would be faced with challenges in the case that the region was lost to communism (Rotter, 1999). Similarly, Japan’s post-war recovery relied on the presence of free markets in the area. France, on the other hand, needed to recall from the region its officers to oversee the rearmament of West Germany but would not do so in the case that the area fell under communism (Rotter, 1999).
On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in response to an apparent attack on its naval ships by North Vietnam. It gave President Johnson broad powers to prevent further aggression by North Vietnam (Ciment, 2007). President Johnson was a believer of the domino theory and was determined to save South Vietnam from communist infiltration. However, he lacked the means as Congress was opposed to proposals of bombing North Vietnam. It was also opposed to America’s involvement in a land war in the region (Ciment, 2007). The resolution, therefore, presented President Johnson with the excuse to move military forces into action and increase America’s involvement in the war.
South Vietnam needed a strong army to resist the infiltration of the Vietcong, and, hence, communism from North Vietnam. Its army, the ARVN was weak and unable to sustain the resistance. It lacked the necessary equipment and training to maintain the resistance. As discussed elsewhere in this essay, the US had committed to helping South Vietnam win against communism. The desire to appear reliable and credible validated its military involvement in the war. It officially joined the war in 1959 when it sent troops to fight side by side with the ARVN to resist communist infiltration. When President Richard Nixon took over the office in 1969, he introduced a new plan, referred to as Vietnamization, which would end America’s participation in the war. According to the plan, the US would train the South Vietnamese army to fight on its own, thereby allowing US troops to withdraw in large numbers (Ladenburg, 2007). Apart from training, America spent a lot of money to arm the ARVN by providing them with better guns, planes, and artillery. President Nixon handed over more than one thousand airplanes and around six hundred helicopters to the South Vietnamese army (Ladenburg, 2007). He also spent billions of dollars on machine guns and modern tanks, which were handed over to the ARVN.
America was heavily involved in the Vietnamese Conflict and the subsequent war. The factors that led to its involvement included its policy to assist other nations to fight communism, the domino theory, the weakness of the South Vietnamese army, and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The desire to help Vietnam fight communism was the first step towards America’s involvement in the conflict and war. It supported the extension of French colonial rule in South Vietnam to prevent the later from falling under communist rule. It also supported South Vietnam’s new government after independence. The domino theory validated America’s involvement in the war as it tried to prevent a chain of reactions of communist takeovers after winning in Vietnam. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave President Johnson the powers to move US army into action against North Vietnam. AVRNs weakness and inability to sustain a resistance increased the reasons for America’s involvement as it sought to help South Vietnam
- Ciment, James. Postwar America. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2007. Print.
- Daum, Andreas W, Lloyd C Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach. America, The Vietnam War, and the World. Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2003. Print.
- Duong, Van Nguyen. The Tragedy of the Vietnam War. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2008. Print.
- Ladenburg, Thomas. Vietnamization. 1st ed. 2007. Web. 27 July 2015. ˂http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu
- Rotter, Andrew J. ‘The Causes of the Vietnam War’. English.illinois.edu. N.p., 1999. Web. 27 July 2015. ˂http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/causes.htm˃
